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Abstract. Kendall Walton argued that photographs are transparent, that we literally see 
things through them. This claim provoked many objections, and one line of argument 
has focused on the fact that when we see objects in ordinary situations we see their 
approximate location with respect to us, whereas in typical photographs we do not. 
The author argues, however, that this egocentric spatial information is not what distin-
guishes literal seeing from typical photograph seeing. Instead of it, the author proposes 
two conditions for normal, literal seeing. One is that the seeing be real-time, and the 
other is that the image be “empty”. Some photographic images meet these conditions.
Keywords. Kendall Walton, photographic Images, transparency.
1. INTRODUCTION
In his well-known article The Ontology of the Photographic Image 
André Bazin asserted: «The photographic image is the object itself» 
(Bazin [1971]: 14). In a similar vein, Kendall Walton famously 
declared that photographs are transparent. What he meant is that 
«we see, quite literally, our dead relatives themselves when we look 
at photographs of them» (Walton [1984]: 252). For Walton, photo-
graphs are on a par with mirrors and other prosthetic devices like 
telescopes and microscopes in their ability to help us see things. This 
claim was a rather bold one and provoked many objections. Among 
them one line of arguments has been prominent. It focuses on the 
fact that when we see an object in ordinary situations we also per-
ceive its approximate location (direction and distance) with respect 
to us, whereas in typical photographs we do not. Gregory Currie 
([1995]: 48-78) and also Noël Carroll ([1996]: 55-63) have argued 
that for this reason we cannot say we literally see things through 
photographs. Knowing the egocentric location of the objects is a 
necessary condition of seeing, they say.
Walton (1997) gave a counterexample to this argument, which I 
think is a legitimate one. If you see a (reflected) flower in a room 
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full of mirrors, you would not know where it actu-
ally is. But isn’t it still true that you see, literally, 
the flower? I can offer a variation of this. Think 
of a boy who sees a fish in a creek. If he does not 
know that the fish appears shallower than it actu-
ally is, Currie and Carroll would have to say that 
he does not see it, which seems counterintuitive. 
They may reply that he knows its location at least 
roughly. Perhaps he does, but the misperception in 
this case is not due to the inevitable imprecision 
of perception which we must tolerate. Instead, it 
is due to a consistent natural phenomenon, which 
the boy can and should learn.
Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin (2004) 
avoid Walton’s counter by proposing a nondox-
astic solution. They retain Currie’s and Carroll’s 
original insight that spatial information is the key, 
but instead of the viewer’s subjective belief about 
the egocentric location of the object, the image’s 
objectively carrying the information was taken as 
the criterion of seeing. Bence Nanay (2010) has 
also proposed a related theory. In this paper, how-
ever, I try to show that spatial relation between 
viewer and object is irrelevant for seeing1. My 
argument will be primarily directed to Cohen and 
Meskin and to Nanay. After that, I argue for alter-
native necessary conditions. One is that the per-
ception be real-time; another is that the image be 
«empty». Finally I show that some photographic 
images meet these conditions.
One thing needs clarification. Walton (2008) 
said that his aim is not conceptual analysis, but 
that is what I will do here. Insofar as he uses an 
existing word («see»), it cannot be immune to 
conceptual analysis. True, he said that he does 
not worry about whether what he proposes is «a 
new sense of the word», and does not mind using 
a new word like schmee instead of see ([2008]: 
111), but I doubt he can be so indifferent. If it is a 
new sense or word, as Berys Gaut says, «the claim 
that we see through photographs would then lose 
1 Helen Yetter-Chappell (2017) recently made a persuasive 
argument against this spatial relation, but her focus is on 
the detachability of eyes. My paper may be regarded as 
offering additional arguments.
most of its interest» ([2010]: 90). Just think of the 
sentence «We literally schmee our dead relatives 
through photographs», where schmee is similar 
to, but not the same as, see. I will take the trans-
parency claim as involving the ordinary sense of 
see, as most disputants did. With his transparen-
cy claim, Walton wanted to explain photographic 
realism—the sense of transparency—and to that 
extent his indifference to the ordinary sense might 
be justified in a way. But the subjective realism 
is irrelevant in this paper2. I am interested in the 
(objective) transparency claim itself, and will try 
to resolve the controversy surrounding it.
2. SPATIAL RELATION IS NOT THE KEY
Cohen and Meskin give an example of X’s 
carrying information about Y: «The state of the 
room’s thermometer carries information about 
the temperature in the room insofar as there is 
an objective probabilistic connection between the 
two» ([2004]: 200). Here, the carrier of informa-
tion is the «state» of the thermometer, specifically, 
the thermometer’s reading. As for the egocentric 
spatial information (ESI), although they some-
times say that the whole device (mirror, telescope, 
etc.) carries it, what actually changes with chang-
ing information seems to be the «image». They 
write, «change in an object’s egocentric location 
would bring about change in the (mirror-pro-
duced) image» ([2004]: 203). I will call this con-
dition MCV (Movement Changes View)3. This 
condition is not met for photographs: «As I move 
around the world with the photograph, the ego-
centric location of the depictum changes, but the 
photographic image does not» ([2004]: 201).
2 I think the strong transparency claim is based on a mis-
understanding of this realism which, I believe, is just 
a psychological effect. Scott Walden (2016) is correct to 
argue that the realism, the «contact phenomenon», is not 
necessary for seeing. Also see Moon (2018).
3 Cohen and Meskin use «image» ambiguously. If I move 
in front of a mirror, the mirror image changes in a sense, 
but in another it does not. What changes with my move-
ment is the perspective view of the mirror image. Hence 
«view» is more appropriate here. 
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I do not think that requiring ESI is equivalent 
to requiring MCV, but for now I concentrate on 
MCV. Nanay’s thesis demands a weaker variant of 
MCV. For him, the view does not need to change 
with every possible movement. What is necessary 
for seeing is that «there is at least one way for the 
perceiver to move such that if she were to move 
that way, her view of the perceived object would 
change continuously» ([2010]: 468). For my pur-
pose, though, this difference is not significant.
It is true that if you move in front of an object, 
normally your view of it changes. But the same is 
true for photographs. Think of a photograph of an 
apple whose image is a circle on the surface. If you 
move in front of it, your view of it will change. For 
instance, the apple (the circle) may look elliptical 
if seen obliquely. But perhaps this is not what is 
meant by MCV. Nanay argues that what changes 
in this case is the view of the photograph itself, not 
of the apple. That is, you do not get to see a dif-
ferent side of the apple. I can grant that, but what 
if the image is 3D? Think of a holographic image 
of the apple. In this case, if you move, you do get 
to see a different side of it. But as Nanay himself 
admits ([2010]: 472, 474-475), this does not seem 
to make the image transparent. I think we agree 
that holographic images in general are not trans-
parent, but even if they were, it would not be due 
to their three-dimensionality. What this shows 
may be only that MCV is not sufficient for see-
ing, but still it is a weakness of the theory. Mirror 
images’ transparency is not explained by their sat-
isfaction of MCV.
Now I will argue that MCV is not neces-
sary for seeing. Imagine an object that is invis-
ible («transparent» in the ordinary sense) except 
from exactly one viewpoint. In this case there 
would be no movement that produces a different 
view, but still we would have to say that we see 
it when we are at that point. It seems that seeing 
a view of an object is sufficient for seeing it, and 
MCV is not required. Proponents of MCV may 
object that disappearance of view is a change in 
view. Perhaps it is, but it is certainly not a continu-
ous change which is important for Nanay. Besides, 
the «change» is not sensitive to the direction or 
amount of movement. Whatever way you move, 
the «change» is the same. Presumably this is not 
what is meant by MCV. Nanay considers a related 
case, where the view remains the same after move-
ment (rather than disappears), and says that this 
is like an afterimage and so is not seeing. But this 
does not necessarily mean that you did not see 
the object before the movement, before you see 
an afterimage. Moreover, suppose that the image 
keeps updating, that is, it is not an after- but cur-
rent-image of the same side. Then I find no reason 
why we cannot say we keep seeing it. (This points 
to the importance of real-time seeing which I will 
discuss later).
There is an interesting difference between the 
two counterexamples I have presented, however. 
Both, as I believe, are counterexamples to MCV, 
but only the second is clearly one to ESI. In the 
first case of visible-only-from-a-point object, if I 
am at that point I would normally see the object’s 
rough egocentric location. It would be odd to say 
that I do not see the location simply because other 
sides are invisible. When I am not at the point, on 
the other hand, I would not need to worry about 
my view’s lacking ESI, for there would be no view 
of the object. Thus this case is not a clear counter-
example to the necessity of my view’s having ESI. 
(In the second case where my view remains after 
movement, though updating, I do have a view 
that does not carry ESI. So this can be a counter-
example). Hence my earlier remark that ESI is not 
equivalent to MCV.
The two examples mentioned are all very 
imaginary. In ordinary cases of direct seeing, 
probably there is no counterexample to either 
MCV or ESI. For ordinary cases of indirect see-
ing, however, necessity of ESI can be easily refut-
ed. (The same is not quite true for MCV). Take 
the case of mirror images. These images can seem 
to carry ESI. For example, one may point to the 
part «mov[ing] around the world with the pho-
tograph» quoted before from Cohen and Meskin, 
and say that we cannot do the same with a mirror 
image. But we can do it. If the mirror moves away, 
the image in it moves away at twice its speed, so if 
you move toward the receding mirror at the same 
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twofold speed, you can keep the image in constant 
perspective (Figure 1). This amounts to «mov-
ing around with the image», and shows that mir-
ror images do not carry ESI. What they normally 
do carry is egocentric spatial information of the 
image itself.
Why then do mirror images feel so informa-
tive spatially? I offer two main reasons. One is that 
in many cases of mirror viewing, you see a reflec-
tion of yourself, and if the mirror image includes 
your image, naturally it carries ESI. The other is 
that in most cases of mirror viewing, you know 
the egocentric position and angle of the device, 
the mirror. Such knowledge is what enables you 
to know the location of the objects seen in it. In 
the case of photographs, we do not usually have 
that knowledge (about the egocentric position and 
angle of the camera), but if we do have it, photo-
graphs can be as spatially informative as the usual 
mirror image.
One may object that we do not just know the 
egocentric position of the mirror when we do 
know it, but we perceive it, whereas we do not 
normally perceive the egocentric past position of 
the camera. But that is not true. We do not usually 
perceive the mirror surface which is what matters. 
When we see a mirror, what we normally see is 
its frame and the image in it. It is true that we can 
usually guess the surface correctly from the posi-
tion of the frame, but the frame can be blocked 
from view, or the mirror can be so big that we 
may not see its boundary. And anyway the frame 
does not determine the surface, for not all mir-
ror surfaces are plane. Thus, to know an object’s 
location via a mirror, normally we need to have 
prior knowledge about its surface. And if knowl-
edge about the device is admitted, as I said, pho-
tographs too can be spatially informative. There 
is no essential difference between mirror images 
and photographs (and holograms too) in terms 
of ESI. From the next section I will put forth my 
own theory of transparency. And in the course of 
that, I will also present more arguments against 
the importance of ESI.
3. REAL-TIME SEEING
Everyday perception is real-time: it is suf-
ficiently immediate. Ordinary mirror images 
are certainly real-time, and this can explain the 
case of Walton’s flower: that we can say we see 
the flower despite our ignorance of its location 
can be explained by the fact that we see it in real 
time. The real-time contact condition can explain 
other phenomena. Most people, I believe, have a 
stronger sense of seeing in a surveillance monitor 
than in a movie. This is not only because the for-
mer may call for our immediate action. Even if the 
image is banal, like the interior of your house with 
just the sunlight in, it will elicit a sense of seeing if 
it is real-time.
Although it takes time for light to travel and 
for our neurons to process the visual informa-
tion, the delay is usually very short. In almost all 
everyday situations our visual perception is suffi-
ciently immediate4. The problem, of course, is star 
watching. As Walton writes, «We also find our-
selves speaking of observing through a telescope 
the explosion of a star which occurred millions 
of years ago» ([1984]: 252). I argue, however, that 
star watching is not a clear counterexample. Think 
of stars’ «twinkling». It is a common expression, 
but the stars themselves do not twinkle, do not 
turn on and off regularly, so it must be a perspec-
4 Nigel Warburton (1988) also emphasized the impor-
tance of real-time («virtually simultaneous» for him) per-
ception, but crucially he did not think that star seeing is 
real-time.
Figure 1. Viewer-object distance changes, but viewer-image dis-
tance is the same.
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tival description. That is, it means that they look 
like twinkling from here, and it is real-time in that 
it refers to a current event: the twinkling happens 
now. And if a star twinkles now, it implies that 
the «star» is there now, regardless of its objective 
existence. Thus insofar as we take stars as some-
times-twinkling things, watching them is immedi-
ate. «Bright star» is another case in point. It means 
that the star is bright now, not that it was bright 
millennia ago. We see a current state of the «star». 
Yet another example is stars’ direction. In a legiti-
mate sense, Polaris is in the north now. When we 
call it the North Star, we do not mean that the star 
was in the north millennia ago. It is in the north. 
It gives us light from that direction now. What 
matters is the light itself, not some information it 
carries about the distant object. This is not to say 
that we experience the light just as sensations. The 
light’s properties are perceived as belonging to a 
distant point (or distant disk of light)5. This is star, 
at least in its traditional sense.
For most of human history, we have been con-
fined to our planet both physically and mentally, 
so it is natural that many of our descriptions of 
stellar objects and events are perspectival. Ameri-
can Heritage Dictionary lists two definitions of 
«star» that are relevant here. One is more scientific 
and mentions things like «mass of gas» and «ener-
gy generated by nuclear reactions». The other is 
traditional and includes many viewpoint-relative 
terms: «Any of the celestial bodies visible at night 
from Earth as relatively stationary, usually twin-
kling points of light». It appears that in this sec-
ond definition, star watching is real-time.
In the first definition, of course, star watch-
ing is not real-time. But it is not obvious that the 
possibility of statements like «I see a star as it was 
millennia ago» poses a problem. For this to be a 
counterexample to my theory, first it must be a 
case of normal, genuine seeing, and, second, it 
must involve delayed seeing. But I think its appar-
5 What I have said of distant stars applies to our sun, too. 
Take sunset, for example. We would say «The sun is set-
ting now», even if the star itself had died suddenly 5 min-
utes ago for some reason.
ent normality is due to the use of the second, tra-
ditional meaning of star, and if so, there should 
be no delayed perception, despite the clause «as 
it was». Just try adding «twinkling» such as «I 
see a twinkling star as it was millennia ago». We 
see that «as it was» clause plays no real role and 
there is no actual delayed perception. Even if we 
drop «twinkling», it is not certain what properties, 
exactly, of the star of the past we see belatedly. Its 
brightness? But what we normally see in the night 
sky is the apparent, not absolute, brightness of the 
stars, and there is no delayed seeing of apparent 
brightness. I am not arguing that star watching 
never involves delay. My point is that there is an 
ambiguity which we had better avoid if we are to 
find out whether delayed-but-normal seeing exists. 
So now I present an example that does not involve 
stars.
Ordinary mirror viewing is real-time, but what 
if the mirror gets farther and farther away? Sup-
pose I place a mirror at a 12-light-hour distance 
from here, and train a gigantic telescope on it so 
that I can see a reflection of the earth via the com-
bination. I will then be able to see this place that I 
am at as it was yesterday, and it is obvious that if 
I see, say, my son playing there/here, I do not see 
him in real time. Is this telescope-mirror transpar-
ent? Do I see, genuinely, my son playing yester-
day? I do not deny an intuition that says yes, but 
there is a legitimate sense in which this is not a 
normal case of seeing. Normally, if I say to people, 
«I see my son», they will take it for granted that I 
see his current state. And if I say, instead, «I see, 
literally, my son of yesterday», they probably will 
not understand what I mean. This suggests that 
normally, seeing implies real-time seeing.
It can be objected that the above telescope-
mirror case is subnormal only because we have 
no actual experience of it, and that if such devices 
become ubiquitous, statements like «I see my son 
of yesterday» will have no problem. That may be 
true, but there is still a sense in which only real-
time seeing is normal. Suppose that all my visual 
perceptions are delayed by a significant amount 
of time, say, one hour. Then I will be practically 
blind. In a sense, even in normal situations I am 
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always blind to something. For example, if I am 
looking forward, I am blind to my back. But we 
do not normally say I am blind for this reason. If I 
see nothing in real time, however, it seems appro-
priate to say that I am blind. Even if the delay is 
only one minute, if I am hit by a car, I will have a 
visual experience of the approaching car probably 
only after I fell down to the ground. Here I would 
be reluctant to say that I genuinely see the car. It 
would be like an afterimage. As another example, 
compare seeing an apple, in the telescope-mirror, 
sitting on your table yesterday (but eaten by now) 
and seeing an apple on your table now (which you 
can eat if you want). In a legitimate sense, you 
really see an apple only in the latter case.
I do not deny that delayed seeing, too, is a 
kind of seeing. But an important part of the trans-
parency theory has been that the road from no 
delay to delay is a «slippery slope» (so delay can-
not be a reason to deny the status of genuine see-
ing) as Walton (1984) and Jonathan Friday (1996) 
have argued, and I think I have showed in this 
section that delay does matter, that there is a sig-
nificant break stopping the slide.
In passing I would like to think about the 
importance of real-time seeing in comparison 
with that of ESI. What is the importance of real-
time seeing? Why would it be necessary for nor-
mal seeing? The obvious answer is because it helps 
our survival. If so, we may compare its importance 
with that of ESI which is also helpful for survival. 
For this, I compare two cases. In the first, ESI is 
present but it is not real-time. In the second, ESI 
is not present but it is real-time. Suppose that in 
the telescope-mirror, my son is (was) at a location 
that is one meter to the left of my present loca-
tion. Does this egocentric information have any 
significance? Hardly. Of what use is it to know 
his past location with respect to my present loca-
tion? Knowing his absolute location at the time 
can be surely useful, but knowing his egocentric 
location is useless when he is not there now. Now 
compare this with the surveillance monitor where 
perception is real-time but the spatial informa-
tion is absent. It is evident that real-time seeing is 
much more important for the purpose of survival. 
If I see an object in the monitor, even if I do not 
know where it is relative to me, there can still be 
time enough to find out. If real-time contact is 
lost, however, nothing can return it to us6.
4. EMPTY IMAGE
I claim that genuine seeing via image is possi-
ble only when the image is empty. «Empty image» 
is to convey the intuitive sense that nothing is real-
ly there at the image location. The canonical exam-
ple is a virtual image, such as a mirror image. We 
clearly have the sense that nothing is really there, 
and hence it is an empty image. But imagine a 
magic mirror, which we can actually step into and 
touch the «image» in it. This is not empty: Some-
thing is really there. This magic mirror is so dif-
ferent from real mirrors, however, that we had 
better drop the name «mirror» and devise a sim-
pler example. The example and argument that I 
am going to make here is actually almost identical 
with that of Gaut ([2010]: 89), although his main 
thesis is different from mine7. Imagine a room 
which is divided into two equal sections, left and 
right, by a line on the ground. On the left, there is 
6 Some comments are in order regarding Currie’s view 
that knowing egocentric temporal location of objects 
is necessary for seeing. The view has some affinity with 
mine, but is different in that the perceiver’s knowledge is 
not a requirement for me. Real-time contact is an objec-
tive relation between the perceiver and the event per-
ceived. Besides, it is a matter of the relation itself, not 
an information about it. Another difference is that Cur-
rie does not explicitly require the temporal relation be 
immediate. Even if there is a significant gap between the 
perception and the perceived event, it seems OK for him 
if the perceiver recognizes the gap somehow.
7 His main thesis there is that «we see an object only if 
rays of light pass uninterruptedly from it to our eyes» 
(Gaut [2010]: 91). But I do not agree with that. He thinks 
Currie’s ([1995]: 60) transducer is not a counterexample, 
but it is. The screen is not like a television screen. Percep-
tually it is like a window, as Currie says. As I understand 
it, it receives a ray at one side and temporarily changes it 
to a different form of energy and then emits another ray 
from the other side as if it were continuation of the for-
mer.
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a real person, and on the right, a wax figure which 
looks and moves exactly like the person on the 
left. Visually the two are indistinguishable, except 
that they are mirror-symmetrical. In fact, if you 
stand on one side, you could mistake the figure on 
the other side as a mirror image. Another impor-
tant fact of this room is that the duplication in 
appearance and movement is produced through a 
mind-independent mechanism, in real time. Now, 
would we say that the figure on the right is trans-
parent? Suppose the person on the left is your son. 
Do you literally see your son via the wax figure? I 
believe, with Gaut, that the intuitive answer is no. 
The image should be empty so that you can see 
right through it, so to speak. Hence my claim that 
only empty images are transparent.
I do not deny that there is a sense in which 
you see your son via the wax figure. After all, it 
provides reliable visual information about him 
in real time, just like a mirror image, and Walton 
might say that this is a case of literal seeing with-
out problem. However, it is also undeniable that 
there is a strong intuition against taking it as lit-
eral seeing. My aim in this paper is not to deny 
that there can be a consistent concept of «see» 
that encompasses all normal photographs and 
also the wax figure, but to find if there is a nar-
rower one. If there is such a narrower one, we may 
take it as the literal, or more literal, concept of 
«see». Our common, I believe, intuition regarding 
the wax figure indicates that there is such a con-
cept. Another indicator is, of course, the intuition 
regarding real-time seeing I discussed in the last 
section. I will try to explain what connects these 
intuitions soon, but before that I need to elaborate 
further on my concept of empty image.
I have considered a virtual image which is 
empty, and a physical figure which is not. But 
there is a middle ground. It is (optical) real imag-
es, examples of which are some holographic imag-
es and the images in some microscopes. There is 
an intuition that these real images are less trans-
parent than virtual ones, and indeed Edwin Mar-
tin (1986) once suggested that only virtual images 
may be transparent. Walton (1986) responded 
to this that real images, too, can be transparent 
because microscopes are transparent. But the real 
images in microscopes are three-dimensional and 
can look like virtual ones. If you realize that they 
are in fact real, you might think again. Suppose 
you enter a «mirror» – something you thought 
was an ordinary mirror at first – and get as close 
as you want to the images, although they are still 
immaterial. Then you would certainly think again 
(about their transparency). Real images definite-
ly feel less transparent, and I think this can be 
explained by our sense that something is there. 
They are called «real», after all. On the other hand, 
however, they feel more transparent than the wax 
figure, and this can be explained by the sense 
that nothing is really there because we pass right 
through them. So I am undecided on whether real 
images are empty or not, and I leave the question 
at that, for this will not matter in my discussion of 
photographic images. My bottom line is that if an 
image is virtual it is empty, and if it is composed 
of matter it is not.
There is a little ambiguity in my use of 
«image». I said that for transparency the image 
should be empty. But is the wax figure an image? I 
think it can be called one. We may call it a «physi-
cally real image», but even if this is not appropri-
ate it should not matter. If it is not an image, I 
can just change my requirement from «image be 
empty» to «representation (or some other suitable 
term) be an empty image».
I have proposed two conditions for (transpar-
ent) seeing, real-time contact and empty image, 
but at first glance they seem unrelated to each 
other. Why the two? It would be good if we had a 
common theme connecting them. I think we can 
find it in the fact that we are embodied creatures 
living in the world. Take the necessity of real-time 
seeing. It is obvious that real-time perception is 
important because we have bodily needs, like get-
ting food and avoiding injury. Even if we were dis-
embodied (so that we cannot physically interact 
with the world, though we can see and visually 
move around), we may suppose that we would still 
have intellectual needs and have to acquire new 
knowledge regularly to survive as minds. Even 
so, real-time seeing is not necessary. We can learn 
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new things from the past world, and besides, even 
if there is a delay of one year in our perception, 
each day will be a new day for us.
It also appears that the distinction between 
empty and non-empty images makes sense only 
because we are embodied. If an image is empty, 
we are not able to interact with it. In fact, I take 
it that an image is empty if and only if there is 
no potential for interaction. In other words, the 
sense that nothing is really there at the image loca-
tion is equivalent to the implicit belief that there 
is no potential for interaction with the image. In 
fact this can explain the ambiguous status of opti-
cal real image. The ambiguity can be ascribed to 
the uncertainty of whether we can say we inter-
act with it. In one sense we do not interact, for we 
pass right through it, but in another sense we do, 
for when we pass we probably disrupt the image.
When we do not interact even with «solid» 
objects due to disembodiment, then, the distinc-
tion between empty and non-empty images will 
have no significance. The entire world will be 
empty, in effect. My proposed concept of literal 
seeing is based on our embodied existence, and it 
entails that if we were disembodied we would see 
nothing literally (except in the sense in which we 
can say we literally see mirror images). Carroll has 
hinted at the same idea. He wrote, «But if we call 
what we see on the silver screen a “view”, then it 
is a disembodied view» ([1996]: 60). Although we 
are not literally disembodied, given that the seeing 
is not real-time, it is not really different from dis-
embodied seeing.
5. SOME PICTURES ARE EMPTY IMAGES 
Photographs are physically real and so it may 
seem they are not empty images. But there is a 
legitimate sense in which the image we actually 
see is an empty one. It is customary to say that 
pictures are 2D images, but in another sense they 
are 3D, and for this latter I will use the notation 
image. This image is empty. What is important in 
this notion is our perception of depth in pictures. 
See Figure 2. We can see it as a 2D array of fig-
ures, but we can also see it as a 3D scene with, say, 
two near and two far balls of the same size. What 
is crucial here is that in the latter case we perceive, 
feel, depth. We do not just know that the picture 
can be interpreted as a scene in depth. A pattern-
recognizing computer can do that, too. We experi-
ence depth, not just understand that something is 
in front of another. I believe that this distinction 
has not been made clearly enough in the previous 
literature on picture perception.
For instance, Richard Wollheim spoke of 
our discerning «something standing out in front 
of […] something else» in pictures (Wollheim 
[1998]: 46), but Malcolm Budd says, «It is unclear 
what Wollheim supposes this visual awareness of 
depth to be» (2008: 203). In fact, if Wollheim had 
meant what I am referring to here, the feeling of 
depth, he would not have argued that we see a 
picture’s surface and its subject matter at the same 
time—his twofoldness thesis. As Figure 2 shows, 
I believe, we cannot feel depth and see surface at 
the same time. The perceived depth is a sort of 
illusion, and having it seems to preclude seeing 
the surface. For us to see both at the same time, 
the picture elements would have to divide roles 
between them. That is, it would have to be that 
some of the line segments cause us to have the 
illusion, while the other segments let us see the 
surface. But I strongly doubt that depth illusion 
works that way. At any rate this paper requires 
only that sometimes we can concentrate on the 
depicted scene, which I think is not a strong 
claim. Think of an audience engrossed in a movie 
at a theater. I doubt anyone among them is aware 
of the screen surface.
Figure 2.
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(Nanay has defended twofoldness thesis by 
supposing that we see, but not attend to, the sur-
face when we see pictures. He says that «while 
we do simultaneously see both the surface and 
the depicted scene, we do not simultaneously 
attend to both» ([2018]: 168). For the purpose of 
this paper, it is fine if we can solely attend to the 
scene. But his defense of twofoldness feels strained 
to me. While unconscious perception is certainly 
possible, do we have to suppose this difficult-
to-confirm process in every picture perception? 
Here I will briefly propose a different theory. It 
is possible that when we see pictures our atten-
tion switches between the surface and the con-
tent so effortlessly, at least in most cases, that the 
two experiences feel simultaneous. Moreover, we 
may hold in memory what we perceived split-sec-
ond before (the surface, say) and compare it with 
what we currently perceive (the content, say), and 
this can contribute to our sense of simultaneous 
awareness. This hypothesis reconciles Wollheim 
with E.H. Gombrich. It admits the impossibility 
of simultaneous perception of surface and con-
tent, but at the same time explains, I believe, what 
Wollheim wanted to explain with his twofoldness 
claim, namely, seeing-in and aesthetic appreciation 
of pictures. Twofoldness does not seem to require 
literal simultaneity of perception).
I return to the problem of depth perception. 
Although everyone will agree that the depicted 
scenes in pictures are 3D, in a way their three-
dimensionality is not very obvious. As Budd 
says, «[The picture-surface] does not seem to the 
viewer that he is seeing a three-dimensional state 
of affairs». Thus his proposition is that «the only 
relevant sense in which a picture, seen as a depic-
tion of its subject, can look like its subject is with 
respect to the two-dimensional aspect of the sub-
ject’s visual appearance» ([2008]: 219). But what 
I am trying to convey is that we do see a three-
dimensional state of affairs in a picture, and that is 
what I call image.
One might think that Figure 2 is a special 
case in which perspective – apparently converg-
ing parallel lines – produces a sense of depth. 
But there are many depth cues, and even in a 
very simple line drawing of a face, say, we per-
ceive the nose as protruding relative to the face 
surface. Computers can recognize the spatial 
relation, but they would not have the phenom-
enology of perceiving a protrusion. Actually, if 
we did not have the depth «illusion», we would 
not see it as a picture of a (normal) face. Depth 
illusion is picture perception, in the sense that 
it is the result of the brain’s construction of a 
3D scene out of the 2D array of marks. We need 
three axes to represent 3D space, and the left-
right (x) and up-down (y) axes are easily repre-
sented, but how do we represent the to-and-fro 
(z) axis? The «illusion» should be understood as 
our visual system’s way of representing the z axis. 
Without it, there is no scene perception. The very 
fact that a picture is intelligible as a depiction of 
3D scene implies that we already have depth illu-
sion in a particular way.
A corollary is that there is no such thing as 
a 2D image, at least in one sense. There are only 
2D arrays of marks in which people see images. 
One may say that images in pictures are 2D in 
that they show, to use John Hyman’s (2006) term, 
«occlusion shapes» of objects. But suppose there 
is a picture of two balls, one partly blocked by 
the other. Most people will see it as I have just 
described, as two balls, but it is not impossible 
to see it as a single strange object. The point is 
that object individuation or figure/ground distinc-
tion should come first before we can say anything 
about shapes, 2D or not, and this individuation 
involves depth perception in most cases. In order 
for us to see the ellipse on a surface as represent-
ing the occlusion shape of a table, for example, we 
need first to see the ellipse as an individual fig-
ure against some background, and this normally 
involves depth perception. It is not that the con-
cept of occlusion shape is useless. It is that calling 
it a 2D image, as if it does not depend on 3D per-
ception, is misleading8. Less misleadingly, it is an 
aspect of a perceived 3D object, of an image. In the 
strict absence of depth perception, pictures of 3D 
8 Anthony Derksen (2004) made a related argument 
against Hyman, but my approach is at a more basic level.
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scene are just meaningless arrays of color patches, 
at least in most cases.
I do not argue that all pictures require depth 
perception. As Hyman ([2006]: 134-136) shows, 
some pictures do not seem to depict depth. What 
I do say is that in the majority of pictures what we 
see in them are (3D) images9, and also that they 
are empty. In this respect, picture perception is 
no different from seeing a mirror image. In both 
cases we see an image of the subject, although in 
the mirror case I do not need to use the notation 
image, for its three-dimensionality is unambigu-
ous. Both images are also empty: nothing is real-
ly there at the image location. The mirror image 
is virtual, of course, but the image in a picture is 
virtual, too, in the sense that the light does not 
come from its apparent location10.
Their difference, of course, is that in pictures 
we also see their two-dimensionality, or «planar-
ity». This planarity is difficult to ignore11. It is 
always ready to be perceived, ready to remind us 
that we are looking at something extraneous to 
the representation (the planarity does not rep-
resent anything). Still, we can evade it in various 
ways. We may try concentrating on the image, 
or if that is difficult we may see the photograph 
through a hole with one eye. Or we may enlarge 
the picture greatly and see it from a great dis-
tance. In this way the planarity can be impercep-
tible (accommodation and binocular depth cues 
have little effect if the scene is distant). In all these 
9 It seems to me that authors are at a loss when they want 
to denote the thing the viewer sees in a picture. It cannot 
be the subject itself, but it cannot be an «image» either, 
for the word is already taken up to refer to the picture 
itself (we cannot say, «I see an image in an image»). Take 
the expression «depicted scene», for example. Readers 
usually understand what it refers to in the context, but 
the expression itself could easily mean the subject, say, 
some historical event.
10 Virtual image is «made by rays that do not actually 
come from where the image seems to be» (Encyclopædia 
Britannica).
11 I avoid using the word «surface» which invokes things 
like texture and surface reflection. Even without those, we 
can perceive the planarity which is a more fundamental 
feature.
cases, the fact remains that we see a photograph. 
Thus, given that photographic images can be pro-
duced in real time, we have the conclusion of this 
paper: some photographic images are transpar-
ent12.
Before closing I want to mention an interest-
ing kind of empty image that is based on photog-
raphy. That is stereoscopic 3D images. Here we 
have a very strong 3D illusion and barely notice 
the planarity, so I am inclined to say that these are 
transparent (if they are real-time). The problem 
is that it seems uncertain whether we can say we 
see photographic images. If we can say we do, we 
have got additional examples of transparent pho-
tographic images.
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